Abstract. This is the first paper presenting consistent and convincing evidence on the benefits of mutual fund option use. Our analysis using a comprehensive and previously unused set of the SEC's own N-SAR filings from 1998 to 2013 reveals that option users have higher risk-adjusted performance. This is based on superior skill and not only due to mechanical effects. Option user funds show significantly less systematic risk because they use options mainly for hedging strategies. Thus, mutual fund option use is beneficial for investors and reduces systematic risk.
Introduction and Literature Overview
This is the first paper presenting consistent and convincing evidence on the question whether the use of options by mutual funds is beneficial or not. The vital importance of this question is documented by the release of a SEC concept paper in 2011 requesting comments on this matter.
1 Moreover, the SEC's agenda for 2015 includes preparing stricter regulation of mutual fund derivative use to limit potential risks posed to the financial system or the broader economy. 2 Our analysis is based on a large, comprehensive and previously unused set of the SEC's own N-SAR filings on US equity mutual funds from 1998 to 2013 and reveals i) that option users have higher risk-adjusted performance compared to nonuser funds which ii) is based on superior skill and not due to purely mechanical effects . Moreover, option user funds iii) have significantly less systematic risk because iv) they use options mainly for hedging strategies and not for speculation. Thus, our comment on mutual fund option use is that it is beneficial for investors and reduces systematic risk, contrary to the SEC's fear.
Previous research on mutual fund option use has not offered such clear evidence.
Lynch- Koski and Pontiff (1999) are the first to examine mutual fund derivative use. They find no significant differences in performance and risk characteristics of users and nonusers.
However, their study is based on a telephone survey of only a small sample of funds for the short period from 1992 to 1994. 3 Since then capital markets experienced dramatic growth, saw some major booms and crises and new regulation like the repealing of the short-short rule in 1997 which necessitates a reassessment of the matter. Cao et al. (2011) find significantly higher raw returns of heavy derivative users during the Russia crisis of August 1998. However, they consider only raw returns so that higher return might simply be a function of higher risk. They allow no assessment as to whether funds use derivatives for speculation or for hedging. Furthermore, the Russia crisis is limited to only one month, so that this result is hardly representative. Chen (2011) as well as Aragon and Martin (2012) find superior 1 http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2011/ic-29776.pdf (accessed 2/13/2015) 2 http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-preps-mutual-fund-rules-1410137113 (accessed 2/13/2015). 3 In addition, the authors admit that managers' answers to the survey are not reliable.
performance of option using hedge funds which seem better capable of exploiting the potentially more efficient information pricing on options markets to generate higher performance at lower risk (e.g., Black, 1975; Cao et al., 2005; Pan and Poteshman, 2006) .
However, as hedge funds are not subject to SEC regulation and thus less restricted in their use of options these findings cannot automatically be transferred to mutual funds.
In the study most closely related to our own, Cici and Palacios (2015) find no significant differences between option users and nonusers except for funds that excessively write puts. However, written puts are the least important option type in their dataset as they account for only 10% of all identified option positions. For 90% of option positions they find no significant effects. Moreover, their results potentially suffer from severe limitations using only information on the funds' holdings of exchange-traded options from 2003 to 2010 which they obtain from Morningstar. They may underestimate option-usage due to i) window dressing in holding reports to make portfolios appear less risky (Musto, 1997 and Morey and O'Neal, 2006; Agarwal et al., 2014) , ii) by neglecting the important market of OTCtraded options, 4 and iii) relying on string searching algorithms to identify option positions from the holdings' names. As a consequence, Cici and Palacios (2015) identify only 250 funds (10% of their sample funds) as option users whereas the information contained in the SEC's mandatory N-SAR filings allows us to identify 612 (24% of our sample) mutual funds as users of options.
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The contribution of this paper is manifold. i) Regarding the literature on the benefits of mutual fund derivative use, we are, to the best of our knowledge, the first to find significant and consistent cross-sectional differences in risk-adjusted performance between 4 In 2013, the dollar volume of options traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) reached an amount of over $560 billion. On the over-the-counter (OTC) market, over $4,207 billion were traded. See CBOE (2013) Market Statistics and BIS (2014) . 5 In unreported tests, we match our N-SAR/CRSP sample to Morningstar portfolio holdings.
On the matched sample we use a similar string searching algorithm as described in Cici and Palacios (2015) . In their sample period from 2003 to 2010 the holdings identify 199 funds (10.0%) as option users while N-SAR identifies 400 funds (20.1%). In our sample period from 1998 to 2013 the holdings identify 279 funds (13.5%) as option users while N-SAR identifies 505 funds (24.5%). Thus, Morningstar portfolio holdings severely underestimate mutual fund option use compared to the information contained in the SEC's mandatory N-SAR filings. iii) We also contribute to the literature on mutual funds' option investment strategies.
Our panel regression methodology and the information on long and short options positions contained in the N-SAR filings allow us to infer the source of the options' impact on mutual funds. The performance-enhancing effect described above is mainly driven by user funds' short option positions which show a performance enhancement of 168 percentage points p.a. This is consistent with an income generation strategy via option premiums. The risk-reducing effect is predominantly driven by option users' long positions in options, consistent with a hedging strategy. Overall, our results indicate that mutual funds use mainly covered call and protective put strategies.
iv) We contribute to the literature on mutual fund performance measurement in general by introducing a new investable factor that controls for option exposures in mutual fund returns. Goetzmann et al. (2007) , among others, show that classic linear performance measures can be biased or even manipulated using options. To control for any such caveat, our new \5-factor investable option strategy (IOS)"-model augments the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model with the excess return of the CBOE S&P 500 BuyWrite Index. In contrast to related approaches (e.g., Agarwal and Naik, 2004) , the IOS factor represents returns of a passive option strategy which is readily investable via index funds and ETFs.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our research hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the regulatory environment for mutual fund options use, presents our dataset and describes performance models. Section 4 presents our empirical results. Section 5 presents alternative explanations for our findings and comments on further robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
Research Hypotheses
In our study we examine four main hypotheses. The first two concentrate on the impact of option use on mutual fund performance and on associated risk. The remaining hypotheses concentrate on the sources of this relation. They test if the effects are mechanical or based on skill and if options are used for hedging or for speculation purposes.
Specifically, our performance hypothesis tests whether option use results in higher risk-adjusted performance or not. Arguments for a negative performance effect include higher administration costs as option use might require more sophisticated information and risk management systems (Lynch-Koski and Pontiff, 1999) . Further, options are complex instruments requiring more experienced fund managers with higher management expense demands (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999) . Bollen and Whaley (2004) argue that due to increased buy pressure by portfolio insurers, options used for hedging are mispriced which could diminish returns. A positive performance effect of option use may arise because of lower transaction costs (Merton, 1995) or the facilitation of altering portfolio risk and return profiles (Merton et al., 1978 and 1982) . Mutual funds may profit from the more efficient information pricing on option markets shown by Black (1975) , Cao et al. (2005) , and Pan and Poteshman (2006) . Guasoni et al. (2011) and Palacios (2015) show that the most important option type used by mutual funds are written calls (60% identified of option positions) which generate steady option premia at low risk. Therefore, we hypothesize:
Option users have lower systematic risk (risk hypothesis).
Our skill hypothesis tests if any performance effect found under the performance hypothesis is a result of superior (or inferior) fund skill. Alternatively, it may be a purely mechanical effect resulting from nonlinearities and asymmetries associated with option returns.
Arguments in favor of the mechanical effect are presented by Leland (1999 ), Lhabitant (2000 , Whaley (2002) , and Goetzmann et al. (2007) who show that performance measures can be biased or even manipulated by using options. On the other hand, if only mutual fund managers with more sophisticated information and risk management systems in place use options (Cao et al., 2005) , than they generate higher risk-adjusted performance even during times when they are not employing options. Therefore, we hypothesize:
Option users are skilled (skill hypothesis).
7 Option pricing models as the Black and Scholes (1977) model assume continuous stochastic processes for the underlying asset as well as continuous rebalancing of a duplication portfolio in order to price options. This is not feasible in practice.
Lastly, our option strategy hypothesis tests if the effects on performance and risk shown under the first three hypotheses are predominantly driven by short or long option positions of mutual funds. Summary statistics in Cici and Palacios (2015) show that covered call (short), which is a strategy for income generation, and protective put (long), which is a hedging instrument, are the most prevalent option types held by mutual funds. Therefore, following from our performance hypothesis, that option users have higher risk-adjusted performance, and from our risk hypotheses, that option use reduces risk, we hypothesize:
The performance effect is mainly driven by short option positions, i.e. covered calls, while the risk effect is mainly driven by long option positions, i.e. protective puts (option strategy hypothesis). However, as the repealing of the short-short-rule with the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 represents a structural break in the regulation of mutual fund derivative use, we limit our sample to the period from 1998 to 2013.
The mutual fund data in N-SAR are at the fund level whereas the data obtained from CRSP are at the share class level. Therefore, we aggregate most variables to fund level by value-weighting according to share class TNA. Fund level TNA is defined as the sum of the share classes' TNA, fund age is the age of the longest existing share class, and the load variable contains load information of the largest share class. We exclude funds before they first surpass the threshold of 5 million US$ in TNA as in Fama and French (2010) to mitigate 8 In additional checks, we show that our results are consistent when only looking at equity options. 9 http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml.
10 Table A in the Appendix shows no significant deviations of our matched sample from the complete CRSP sample of actively managed domestic equity funds with respect to major fund characteristics.
incubation bias (Evans, 2010) . 11 As we estimate performance measures via Regression analysis, we also exclude funds with less than 24 monthly observations in order to obtain reliable results. 12 The final sample consists of 2,576 actively managed domestic equity mutual funds with 231,641 monthly data points. To our best knowledge, this is the largest matched N-SAR/CRSP dataset used in the mutual fund derivative literature to date.
OPTION VARIABLES
The main explanatory variable in our cross-sectional regressions, Useri, is a dummy variable which equals one if a fund uses options of some kind at least once during our sample period and zero otherwise. 13 Panel A of Table I reports summary statistics on cross-sectional option permission and usage. 94% of funds are allowed to purchase and write options but only a fraction of them actually makes use of this permission. 14 24% of all funds use some kind of option at least once. This is consistent with Almazan et al. (2004) who show that mutual funds fixate permissions in their fundamental investment policies to ensure the greatest possible scope for investment practices, regardless of their inclination of actually using them.
The underlying securities of our options are mainly stocks and stock indexes. This is not surprising because our sample consists solely of equity funds. Deli and Varma (2002) and Chen (2011) interpret the suitability of the options to the respective investment style as evidence that funds try to mitigate transaction costs by using derivatives. Panel A further reports the average percentage of time the funds actually use options, which is only 40% of the time.
[Insert Table I here.]
The main explanatory variable in our panel regressions, Usingi;t, is a dummy variable which equals one in each month a user fund employs some kind of option and zero otherwise. Panel B of Table I shows statistics on option permissions and usage from our panel analysis. In 89% of all monthly fund observations funds are permitted to use at least one kind of option.
However, options are actually used in only 9% of all observations. Hence, the decision to employ options might be made tactically by fund managers. To capture this effect, we define the dummy variable Active_non_usingi;t which equals one if a user fund does not use options in a specific month, and zero otherwise. In addition we use balance sheet data on long and short option dollar amounts to infer actual fund option strategies, i.e. if funds use options for hedging or for speculation purposes.
To differentiate between the effects of long option positions and short option positions on performance and risk we define two new dummy variables. Longi;t equals one in all periods a fund has a net long position in options and zero otherwise. Analogously, t Shorti; equals one if the fund has a net short position in options and zero otherwise.
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
To measure fund performance and risk we use fund gross returns. Fama and French (2010) as well as Pastor and Stambaugh (2014a) argue that gross returns are more appropriate for the measurement of skill because they represent the returns generated by manager's investment decisions. Our baseline performance model is Carhart's (1997) 4-factor model as it is the widest spread model to date and pricing factors are readily available on Kenneth French's homepage. 16 It is based on the following regression:
ERi;t = F ®i; 4 + ¯i;MktERMkt;t + ¯i;SMBSMBt + ¯i;HMLHMLt
where ERi;t is the gross excess return of fund i in month t. ERMkt;t is the market excess return, SMBt is the size factor, HMLt is the value factor (Fama and French, 1993) , and MOMt is the momentum factor (Carhart, 1997) , respectively. The main variables of interest are the funds' risk-adjusted performance, Considering that mutual funds use options, the original Carhart 4-factor model might be subject to bias or even manipulation due to nonlinearity and asymmetry in option returns (e.g., Goetzmann et al., 2007) . Therefore, we propose a new \5-factor IOS-model" which equals the Carhart model augmented by an investable option strategy factor (IOS)
represented by the excess return of the CBOE S&P 500 BuyWrite Index. 17 This index replicates a feasible passive total return covered call strategy. 18 In particular, the strategy is long the S&P 500 market portfolio and sells one-month near-the-money call options on the S&P 500 every month. Thus, it does not use model-inferred option prices but market prices of actually traded options including potential mispricing due to market incompleteness (Guasoni et al, 2011) or buy pressure by portfolio insurers (Bollen and Whaley, 2004) . Furthermore, the return distribution of the index is negatively skewed and non-linear. 19 The performance regression is as follows:
ERi;t = F ®i; 5 + ¯i;MktERMkt;t + ¯i;SMBSMBt + ¯i;HMLHMLt
To control for higher moments in fund returns, especially in those of option users, we additionally use Leland's alpha. Leland (1999) argues that long option positions generate positive skewness due to limited downside risk and lead to negatively biased alphas. Short option positions conversely generate negative skewness due to limited upside potential and therefore lead to positively biased alphas. Thus, we control for higher moments in fund returns by using the following model where E(ri) is the expected gross return of fund i and E(rMkt) is the expected market return to measure performance:
where:
Furthermore, symmetric CAPM-based performance models may also be inadequate because options generate asymmetric payoff profiles. Bawa and Lindenberg (1977) argue that downside risk is more relevant. Thus, we use the Bawa/Lindenberg-alpha which considers the semi-variance instead of the symmetric variance to measure performance:
As the models by Leland (1999) and Bawa and Lindenberg (1977) are based on the CAPM, they consider only the market factor. To control for size, value and momentum we orthogonalize fund and market returns against the remaining Carhart factors using a similar transition as in Rohleder et al. (2011) and Cici and Palacios (2015) . Table II reports cross-sectional summary statistics on mutual fund characteristics separately for option users and nonusers. Option users are bigger on average but smaller in the median.
Empirical Results

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
This means that there are a large number of small option users and only a small number of large option users. Option users are older on average but younger in the median so that a large number of users is rather young which Pastor et al. (2014a) associate with a higher level of skill. User funds have higher turnover both on average and in the median. This could be due to more active management of user funds which, e.g., Amihud and Goyenko (2013) and Pastor et al. (2014b) associate with higher skill. Option users charge higher expense ratios and the fraction of load funds is higher consistent with Lynch-Koski and Pontiff (1999).
Higher fees could be charged to compensate for higher costs associated with more sophisticated information and risk management systems as well as more experienced fund managers. However, there is no significant difference in manager tenure between option users and nonusers. Users hold more cash on average which could be associated with the requirement of holding liquid assets in a segregated account. Besides, user funds experience smaller amounts of net flows on average. We use all of the fund characteristics as control variables in our further analyses (e.g., Almazan et al., 2004; Ferreira et al., 2012) .
[Insert Table II here.]
Regarding gross excess returns, user funds tend to have lower returns on average (0.48% vs.
0.52%). However, the difference is not statistically significant. Total risk, as measured by the standard deviation of returns, does not differ between users and nonusers. Regarding the return distribution's higher moments, there are no significant differences between users and nonusers, except for slightly less negative skewness of users. This could be due to more long option positions such as protective puts (e.g., Leland, 1999) used for hedging purposes. The statistics on risk-adjusted performance present first evidence in favor of our performance hypothesis as user funds have significantly higher alphas according to all four performance models compared to nonusers (e.g., 0.72% vs. 0.12% p.a. in case of the Carhart model).
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Market betas associated with the four performance models offer first evidence in favor of our risk hypothesis. They are significantly lower for option users than for nonusers (95.84% vs.
99.07% in case of the Carhart model).
CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS
To test our performance hypothesis, that option use enhances risk-adjusted performance we run the following cross-sectional regression:
where A performanceE iA is defined as fund i's risk-adjusted performance measured with either of the four performance models described in Section 3.4 using monthly gross returns over the entire sample period for each fund. The variable of interest, A UserE iA , is defined as in sub-section 3.3 and is one if a fund uses options of some kind at least once and zero otherwise. Table III reports the results. The A UserE iA dummy has significantly positive influence on the Carhart 4-factor alpha supporting our performance hypothesis. If a fund uses options at least once during its existence, it offers superior risk-adjusted performance on average compared to a nonuser fund. Similar results are displayed for the other measures explicitly controlling for option-specifics in fund returns. Hence, the performance-enhancing effect is not due to any mechanical bias.
The coefficients on the control variables indicate that larger funds with more experienced fund managers generate significantly higher performance. Higher turnover on the other hand reduces performance which is in line with higher transaction costs associated with more intensive trading (e.g., Carhart, 1997) or with overconfidence (e.g., Puetz and Ruenzi, 2011) . Management fees have a negative impact on fund performance in line with results of Carhart (1997) . The coefficients for loads and for net fund flows have positive signs, although only the latter is statistically significant. Older funds have a slightly lower risk-adjusted performance consistent with Pastor et al. (2014a) . Funds that hold more cash have higher performance in line with Simutin's (2013) findings.
[Insert Table III here.]
To test our risk hypothesis, that option users have lower risk, we run a second crosssectional regression where the dependent variable A riski E A is defined as the market beta of fund i according to either of the four performance models: [Insert Table IV here.]
Overall, the results of our cross-sectional regressions confirm our first two research hypothesis, the performance hypothesis and the risk hypothesis, in showing that option use enhances risk-adjusted performance while at the same time reducing systematic risk. This is in contrast to the SEC's worries that mutual fund option use could pose risk to the financial system or the broader economy. In the following we analyze the sources of these effects in more detail.
PANEL ANALYSIS OF SKILL
Our cross-sectional regressions show that option use has a performance-enhancing effect for mutual funds. This could be a mechanical effect arising from option characteristics. 
Here, performancei;t is the risk-adjusted performance of fund i in month t measured using daily gross returns via either of the four performance models described in sub-section 3.4.
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The variables of interest, Usingi;t and Active_non_usingi; t, are defined as in sub-section 3.3
and indicate if a fund uses options in a specific month or if a user fund actively decides not to use options in a specific month, respectively. If the performance-enhancing effect of option use is purely mechanical then exclusively Usingi,t should display a positive impact on performance. If, on the other hand, the effect is partly due to superior skill then Active_non_usingi; t should also have a positive and significant coefficient.
In Panel A of Table V the coefficient on Usingi,t shows that option employment generates an outperformance of 0.72% p.a. on average (Carhart) . This result holds for all of our four performance measures and is further evidence in favor of our performance hypothesis. 24 More interestingly, the coefficient for Active_non_usingi; t is also positive and highly significant for all four performance models, except for Bawa/Lindenberg. This means that user funds that actively decide not to use options in a given month exhibit an 22 In additional analyses we alternatively use the approach proposed by Dimson (1979) to control for any bias caused by non-synchronous trading in daily returns. The results are qualitatively the same. 23 In additional analyses we also calculate monthly alphas using monthly returns via rolling window regressions for 12-and 36-months windows, both overlapping and non-overlapping. The results are qualitatively the same.
outperformance of 0.48% p.a. compared to nonusers. Hence, we conclude that the superior performance of user funds has its roots at least partly in valuable selection or timing skills of fund managers lending strong support to our skill hypothesis.
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[Insert Table V here.]
As the cross-sectional regressions have shown that option users have lower market risk, these findings could, however, be spurious if option users have per se lower risk. Therefore, we run the following panel regression analog to Regression (7) explaining risk:
where riski;t is the market beta of fund i in month t measured by either of the four performance models using daily data. The coefficient on Table V shows that option use leads to significantly lower market risk as beta is reduced by 10 percentage points on average. The results hold for all four models consistent with our risk hypothesis.
More importantly, the coefficients for Active_non_usingi; t are insignificant and near-zero.
Thus, the risk-reducing effect of option use is purely mechanical. This presents further evidence that the performance-enhancing effect shown in Panel A is not based on structural risk differences between users and nonusers per se. Thus, the strong performance-enhancing effect combined with the non-existing risk-reducing effect of Active_non_usingi; t confirms our skill hypothesis that option user funds exhibit more skill compared to nonusers.
PANEL ANALYSIS OF OPTION STRATEGIES
In the following, we analyze which option strategies predominantly drive the performanceenhancing effect documented under our performance hypothesis and which option strategies drive the risk-reducing effect documented under our risk hypothesis. Our option strategy 25 In additional analyses, we test if this result holds for funds exclusively using single stock options as one could argue that picking single stock options requires more skill. Moreover, single stock options should exhibit more mispricing and picking potential compared to index options due to market incompleteness (e.g. Guasoni et al., 2011 
riski;t = Á0 + Á1Longi; t + Á2Shorti; t + § J j=3 ÁjControlsi;j;t + t ´i; [Insert Table VI here.]
26 Untabulated statistics show that option users are net long in 19% of the using months and net short in 36% of the using months. In the remaining using months they have net zero options positions and are treated as nonusers. In additional tests, we exclude all net zero user fund months from the sample. The results are the same.
Regarding the specific option types used by mutual funds, lower systematic risk can only be achieved via long options if funds purchase puts. This has the effect of indirectly selling exposure to the option's underlying. It is now logical to assume that option users' long positions in options are predominantly protective puts as introduced by Merton et al. (1982) .
Further, the risk-reducing effect documented also for short positions in options can only be achieved if funds write calls and thereby indirectly sell exposure to the option's underlying.
As the SEC requires all short positions in options to be covered, the predominant short option strategy employed by option users must be a covered call strategy. This confirms our option strategy hypothesis, that option user funds use protective put strategies for hedging purposes in combination with covered calls to generate steady income through option premiums. It is also consistent with summary statistics in Cici and Palacios (2015) , who in sharp contrast to our clear findings, find no significant effect of these option types on performance or risk.
Alternative Explanations and Robustness
LEVERAGE EFFECT
Performance as measured by linear regression models is a function of systematic risk. Hence, any non-zero alpha can be scaled up and down the security market line using leverage (e.g., Rudd and Clasing, 1988; Scholz and Wilkens, 2005) . In case of mutual funds, a manager who generates a non-zero alpha could increase or decrease it by leveraging the alpha generating holdings. As options are leveraged investments in the underlying asset, the performanceenhancing effect of using options could be a consequence of the leverage effect inherent in options. To rule out this explanation, we run additional analyses similar to Regressions (5) and (7) including market beta as an additional control variable. Results indicate that the impact of systematic risk on performance is negative but insignificantly so, while our main finding that option use enhances performance both in the cross-section and in the panel remains the same.
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To further control for any biases that might occur because of leverage we estimate the \market-risk-adjusted performance" measure proposed by Scholz and Wilkens (2005) and the \manipulation proof performance" measure proposed by Goetzmann et al. (2007) . The results are qualitatively the same as in our main analysis. Thus, leverage cannot explain our results.
MARKET TIMING
Classic market timing approaches such as the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) model are often criticized because any loadings on the squared market factor intended to measure timingactivity could also represent other sources of nonlinearity such as options (e.g., Jagannathan and Korajczyk, 1986) . Using the reverse argumentation, our findings regarding the effect of option use on performance and risk could be driven by option users' market timing activities.
Therefore, in additional analyses, we include a Treynor and Mazuy (1966) timing term in the Carhart (1997) model. The results are the same as in our main analysis.
To further control for conditional market timing based on publicly available information, we also recalculate performance and risk measures using a Carhart (1997) model where the market beta is measured conditional on the factors proposed by Ferson and Schadt (1996) . The results are qualitatively the same as in our main analysis. Thus, market timing also cannot explain our results.
ALTERNATIVE RISK MEASURES
In our main analysis, we measure risk using the market beta from either of the four performance models. However, the results regarding risk-reducing effects of option use might be spurious if risk is simply shifted to other risk factors. Therefore, in additional tests, we estimate Regressions (6) and (8) using total risk as measured by funds' return volatility instead of beta. The results are similar to those in our main analysis.
To test further if any of the higher moments in option user returns can explain the risk-reducing effect compared to nonusers, we estimate Regressions (6) and (8) using skewness and kurtosis instead of market beta. The effect on skewness is negative and on kurtosis positive, although not statistically significant at conventional levels. Overall, the use of alternative risk measures and higher moments of the return distribution cannot explain the results in our main analysis lending further confidence to the validity of our main results.
FURTHER ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
To rule out that our choice of Carhart's (1997) model as our baseline model drives our results, we estimate fund performance and risk using the CAPM and the Fama and French (1993) Moreover, Cremers et al. (2013) introduce a novel approach of measuring performance with easily investable, feasible benchmarks. They argue that the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) factors suffer from several biases, especially that they produce non-zero alphas on average. Therefore, in additional tests, we employ the index-based 4-factor and 7-factor proposed by Cremers et al. (2013) . Results are similar to those in our main analysis. 
Conclusion
We show that the use of options by mutual funds yields higher risk-adjusted performance compared to nonuser funds. This is not only due to mechanical effects but also based on superior skill of option user funds' managers. Moreover, option user funds show significantly less systematic risk because they use options mainly for hedging strategies and not for speculation. Previous research on mutual fund option use has not offered such clear evidence as most of these studies suffer from severe data limitations whereas we are able to base our analysis on a large, comprehensive and previously unused sample of the SEC's mandatory N-SAR filings. We thereby contribute to several streams in mutual fund research. Specifically, we add to the literature on the benefits of mutual fund derivative use by showing a performance-enhancing and risk-reducing effect of option use and to the literature on fund manager skill by showing that option users are more skilled than nonusers. Further, we contribute to the literature on mutual fund option investment strategies by showing that the performance-enhancing effect is, consistent with covered call strategies for income generation, predominantly driven by funds' short positions. The risk-reducing effect of options is mainly driven by funds' long option positions, consistent with protective put strategies for hedging.
Lastly, we contribute to the literature on performance measurement in general by introducing the new 5-factor IOS-model, which controls for option exposure in mutual fund returns using a feasible option strategy based on actually traded investment alternatives.
Overall, this paper helps answer the vital question if derivative use by mutual funds is beneficial or not released onto the public in a concept paper by the SEC in 2011 and currently leading to the preparation of new regulation by the SEC in fear of any risk posed to the financial system or the broader economy. However, our results indicate that such fears might be unjustified as mutual fund option usage enhances their performance and reduces their systematic risk.
Appendix: N-SAR-CRSP Matching and Data Screening
From the SEC's EDGAR online database we obtain 129,318 individual N-SAR-filings for the period from 1998 to 2013 in unformatted text format which are parsed into a formatted table using regular expressions under Linux. In addition, we extract ticker symbols from the header sections of the filings. To construct our final dataset, this table must be matched to the funds in the CRSP database. Unfortunately, there is no common identifier in CRSP and N-SAR.
Even worse, in N-SAR there is no consistent fund identifier over time. Although the general instructions of the SEC urge registrants to use consistent information, the company identification key (CIK) and series numbers change over time for a substantial number of funds. Consequently, we match N-SAR and CRSP using the funds' names for each reporting date. For entries where ticker information is available in both CRSP and N-SAR filings, we additionally use the ticker symbols to match the funds. To improve our matching accuracy we clean fund names in CRSP and N-SAR by hand, i.e. by deleting special characters such as \," and \:" and standardize abbreviations (e.g., \Small CP" or \Small Capitalization" becomes \Small Cap"). library. In tests with our database, we find the Jaro-Winkler algorithm to be superior to other string matching techniques in the SimMetrics library regarding speed and matching accuracy.
Since algorithmic string matching techniques can lead to false positive matches, all matches are checked manually for plausibility. In the following step, the match sample is cleaned from further false positives as in Chen et al. (2013) . Funds with discrepancies of more than 10% for net assets reported in N-SAR and CRSP in more than 25% of the reported months are rigorously discarded from our sample. Table A presents cross-sectional statistics of fund characteristics for both the matched N-SAR/CRSP sample and from the complete actively managed domestic equity fund universe from CRSP to check for any systematic biases in our sample. However, there is no significant difference in the main fund characteristics. Thus, we conclude that our sample is representative for the universe of all active U.S. domestic equity funds. [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] with N-SAR filings and entries in CRSP. In Column (1) fund performance is measured using the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model. Column (2) reports results for the Carhart (1997) model plus an investable option strategy (IOS) factor based on the CBOE BuyWrite index. In Column (3) fund performance is measured via the model developed by Leland (1999) and Column (4) reports outcomes for the model according to Bawa and Lindenberg (1977) . User is one if a fund uses any kind of option at least once during its existence. All variables are averages over time for each individual fund. ***. **. * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are given in parentheses (White, 1980 Carhart (1997) model plus an investable option strategy (IOS) factor based on the CBOE BuyWrite index. In Column (3), market risk is measured via the model developed by Leland (1999) and Column (4) reports outcomes for the model according to Bawa and Lindenberg (1977) . User is one if a fund uses any kind of option at least once during its existence. All variables are averages over time for each individual fund. ***. **. * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are given in parentheses (White, 1980 Carhart (1997) model plus an investable option strategy (IOS) factor based on the CBOE BuyWrite index. In Column (3), fund performance is measured via the model developed by Leland (1999) and Column (4) reports outcomes for the model according to Bawa and Lindenberg (1977) . All performance and risk measures are calculated for each fund and month individually using daily return data. Panel A displays the results for performance and Panel B for risk, respectively. The dependent variables are regressed on the dummy pair Using and Active non using. Using is one if a user fund invests in options in the respective month and zero otherwise. Active non using is unity if a user fund does not use options in the respective month and in all other cases zero. All variables are monthly. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The standard errors are clustered by fund and given in parentheses. [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] with N-SAR filings and entries in CRSP. The dependent variables, fund performance and market risk, are measured using the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model in column (1). Column (2) reports results for the Carhart (1997) model plus an investable option strategy (IOS) factor based on the CBOE BuyWrite index. In Column (3), fund performance is measured via the model developed by Leland (1999) and Column (4) reports outcomes for the model according to Bawa and Lindenberg (1977) . All performance and risk measures are calculated for each fund and month individually using daily return data. Panel A displays the results for performance and Panel B for risk, respectively. The dependent variables are regressed on the dummy pair Long and Short. Long is one if a user fund is net long options in the respective month and zero otherwise. Short is unity if a user fund is predominantly writing options in the respective month and in all other cases zero. All variables are monthly. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The standard errors are clustered by fund and given in parentheses. 
